The Mystery of Governance: Its Direct and Indirect Impact on Economic Growth by Walton, Kevin John Davlin
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1340
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2010
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
The Mystery of Governance: Its Direct
and Indirect Impact on Economic Growth
Author: Kevin John Davlin Walton
* I am thankful to Professor Robert Murphy for his time and dedication in helping me construct this paper and its 
data set. I am also thankful to the other faculty members that have helped me with my statistical work as well as my 
fellow classmates for their help, comments, and suggestions on the working drafts and presentation of this paper. 
 
The Mystery of Governance: 
Its Direct and Indirect Impact on Economic Growth 
 
 
 
Kevin Walton* 
 
Advised by: 
Professor Robert G. Murphy 
May 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explore the connection between governance and economic growth. 
Economic growth has been a phenomenon experienced by some countries, but totally lacking in others.  
This paper explores the role of governance on growth, utilizing the governance indicators developed by 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project.  I develop a model that is a synthesis of the 
Solow Growth Model, as well as the growth models developed by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). My results conclude that governance is linked with economic growth 
through two channels: first, governance and economic growth are positively correlated with each other; 
and secondly, good governance positively affects trade and investment, which then is positively 
associated with the growth of GDP per capita. Thus, good governance should be of the utmost concern for 
countries attempting to achieve growth of GDP per capita. 
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I. Introduction 
Many countries of the Rest [developing countries] have conditions unfavorable to democracy 
and good government: they are producers of natural resources such as oil, and/or are unequal 
agrarian societies, and/or are just unequal, and/or have a lot of ethnic conflict. So many 
countries of the Rest have corrupt and undemocractic governments. Badly governed countries 
are poor countries. 
William Eaterly 
―The White Man’s Burden,‖ p. 130 
 
 Economic growth is an important priority for a country. Steady, positive growth increases 
the standards of living in the country and improves conditions for its citizens. Yet a fundamental 
question persists: What affects the economic growth of a country? Governments and institutions 
constantly attempt to implement policies or laws that they hope facilitate economic growth. 
Academics and institutions research and study the factors that affect growth, everything from 
ethnic fractionalization to economic policies. Nonetheless, a critical factor has often been 
overlooked in much of the current research: the quality of governance in a country. Does a 
country with relatively better governance better facilitate economic growth? Does a country with 
relatively higher governance enable its citizens to have higher GDP per capita? 
 This paper examines the effect that good governance has on a country’s economic 
growth. Burnside and Dollar showed in their 2000 paper that aid has a positive effect on growth 
in governments with good economic policies. Kaufmann and Kraay presented the theory that 
better governance causes economic growth. Expanding upon these ideas and using an updated 
version of the World Bank’s governance indicators, I argue that an improvement in the level of 
governance increases a country’s GDP per capita. Using the Solow Growth Model as a 
theoretical framework, the increase in GDP per capita in a given country is due to a shift towards 
a higher, long-run steady state level of GDP per capita. Thus, better governance in a country 
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leads to short-term economic growth to a higher steady state and GDP per capita in the long-
term.  To explore this idea, I use a growth equation modeled after Burnside and Dollar’s 
equation (2000) in addition to the growth and governance equation developed by Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2002), using governance data from the World Bank. Using a panel data regression, I test 
the equation with different variables.
1
 I hope to find that there is a positive correlation between 
the governance indicator and the growth rate of a country’s GDP per capita. This would indicate 
that better governance is linked to higher GDP per capita. 
 I begin this paper with a brief background of the current efforts undertaken to raise the 
level of GDP per capita, which is giving aid to developing countries. I analyze the level of aid 
given to developing countries by the OECD and then link the effectiveness of aid in promoting 
economic growth to the recipient country’s governance. Then I state the thesis question that I am 
attempting to investigate. Next, I will discuss the current literature concerning growth and the 
main factors of it.  The literature on economic growth is quite extensive and covers factors from 
linguistic fractionalization to education.  The following section will lay the foundation for my 
methodology of my model, including a thorough discussion of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and the Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) papers as well as the Solow Growth Model. I will also 
develop my governance and growth equation with my hypothesis in this section. Then, I will 
introduce my data, give summary statistics for my data set, and discuss the statistical problems 
that arose.  This will be followed by a discussion of my regression results and interesting 
findings in the regressions. Lastly, I will conclude that governance and growth are linked 
together and conjecture that governance affects growth through two different channels. 
                                                          
1
 These independent variables include the governance indicator, growth of total trade per capita, growth of 
investment per capita, and growth of aid receipts per capita. The dependent variable is the growth of GDP per capita. 
There will be more on this equation in a later section. 
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Background of Current Strategy to Reduce Poverty and Promote Growth: Aid 
In 2002, the United Nations commissioned the Millennium Project, which consists of 
eight Millennium Goals. The United Nations’ report Investing in Development: A Practical Plan 
to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals says that ―the Millennium Development Goals‖ 
seek to eradicate ―extreme poverty in its many dimensions—income, poverty, hunger, disease, 
lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion—while promoting gender equality, education, and 
environmental sustainability‖ (U.N. Report, p. 1). This report calls for the nations and 
international organizations of the world to end extreme hunger and poverty of the world’s 
population, quantitatively halving the number by 2015. To do so, many modern economists 
believe that aid is required.  This aid can help a country develop a better infrastructure, fund 
schools, care for the sick, and bring its people out of poverty. A missing link, however, is the 
connection between aid and growth; this is where the governance of a country becomes 
important. The governance of a country is important in relation to aid received because it 
influences the usage of the aid and its effectiveness. If a country is relatively corrupt, for 
example, any aid given to that country will be ―wasted aid.‖ On the other hand, if the country has 
relatively good governance with clear transparency, then aid given to that country will likely 
benefit its people and lift the poor out of poverty. I conjecture that aid given by rich countries, 
institutions, and organizations will only affect the economic growth of developing countries if 
their governance is relatively good, while aid given to poorer countries with relatively bad 
governance will be ―wasted aid.‖ 2 
                                                          
2
 ―Wasted aid‖ is aid that is given to a developing country and does not produce growth in the country. Instead, the 
aid promotes either a negligible change in the economy or the further decline in the economy. This could be the 
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 The majority of the aid given to developing countries is from the developed countries and 
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations. A principal agent 
giving assistance to developing countries is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The DAC has the 
responsibility of being ―the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to 
co-operation with developing countries‖ (DAC website). Member countries that give assistance 
to the poorer nations of the world have their aid recorded with the DAC. The Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is the amount of money in the form of assistance that the DAC 
gives to developing countries each year. In 2001, the ODA that the DAC gave to developing 
countries was $52.4 billion. This sum amounted to only 0.18 percent of OECD countries’ Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which was $28.78 trillion at the time (DAC website; author’s 
calculations). 
 In 2001, James Wolfensohn, who was then the president of the World Bank, argued for a 
higher amount of ODA. He alleged that the current amount of aid given to developing countries 
was not sufficient to produce economic growth. He claimed that ―if [the OECD countries] are 
serious about ensuring a beneficial globalization and meeting multilateral development goals 
[they] have all signed on to, [they] must double ODA from its current level of about $50 billion a 
year‖ (James Wolfensohn, 2001). To his credit, OECD countries more than doubled the amount 
of money given to developing countries in the form of assistance in less than seven years. In 
2008, the real amount of money given by the DAC countries for development assistance totaled 
just under $120 billion, but equaled only 0.30 percent of OECD countries’ GDP. While the 
amount of aid grew by 129 percent from 2001 to 2008, the percentage of GDP in OECD 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cause of a corrupt government or the inability to funnel aid money into the institutions that could positively benefit 
from the aid. More of this will be discussed later in the paper. 
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countries consisting of foreign aid given to developing countries rose by only a mere 67 percent 
during the same time period (Figure 1). Although the gross amount of aid more than doubled, in 
terms of the countries’ GDP, it did not double. 
 As seen in Figure 1, the total amount of aid relative to GDP among the OECD countries 
has increased only slightly. Relative to the overall GDP of the OECD countries, the aid given to 
developing countries is practically negligible. OECD countries could make a larger impact in 
developing countries by raising the amount of GDP that is given in aid; however, the aid given 
must be given with caution. As seen with the quote at the beginning of this section, William 
Easterly said in The White Man’s Burden that ―badly governed countries are poor countries‖ (p. 
130). This leads to the idea that the first step that must be taken to promote growth in a 
developing county is to fix the governance—only once the governance is good can aid promote 
economic growth and development in the county. If the United Nations’ Millennium Goals are to 
be met by their deadline, then there must something else done besides a drastic increase in the 
amount of aid given to developing countries; the money that is allocated as aid to developing 
countries from OECD countries must not be ―wasted aid.‖ Rather, the aid given to the 
developing countries must promote growth
3
 and development that brings impoverished people 
out of poverty. This, I hypothesize, requires good governance as a prerequisite before aid is 
given to a developing country. 
  
                                                          
3
 Growth is an important concept in regards to developing countries. Donor countries attempt to foster growth by 
giving aid to poor countries. Similarly, the governments of developing countries are oftentimes concerned with 
initiating or promoting growth. Growth, in the sense of this paper, refers to the change in real GDP per capita. When 
looking at growth of a country, the unit will be in United States dollars. A growing country is a country that had 
GDP per capita increasing each year, as a year-over-year percentage. A non-growing country is one that has a 
stagnant or declining GDP per capita. For the sake of this paper, countries that have GDP per capita that are only 
increasing by less than a percent per year are considered to be non-growing countries. 
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2. Thesis Question 
 Many papers have looked at factors that promote and effect growth in countries, 
specifically developing countries. Certain studies look at monetary indicators or macroeconomic 
indicators and their effects on growth. Often overlooked are governance indicators and their 
impact on growth. I theorize that governance indicators
4
 are a vital indicator in determining the 
potential for growth in a given country. This paper will assess if governance does indeed matter 
for economic growth of a country, and if so, the extent that governance does matter.  I will also 
give specific attention to low-income countries versus high-income countries
5
 in the analysis of 
the extent that good governance matters for economic growth. If governance is relatively more 
important for low-income countries, then governments and institutions that are giving aid to 
developing countries may want to devote more time and resources to improving governance in 
the recipient countries before giving them more aid.
6
 The question I seek to explore in this paper 
is: What is the connection between good governance and the growth of GDP per capita? 
 
3. Literature Review 
 A substantial body of literature considers the factors that affect economic growth in a 
country. The majority of these papers looks at specific causes and focus on either a certain subset 
of countries or a region. While the literature concerning economic growth was extensive before 
the 1990s, it has multiplied after 1990. There are two main reasons for this huge increase in the 
                                                          
4
 Governance indicators will be the following six measures: voice and accountability, political stability and absence 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
5 
For the list of low-income countries and high-income countries, refer to Table 1 and Table 2 in the Appendix. I use 
the World Bank’s list of countries by income, specifically the categories encompassing low-income and high-
income countries (World Bank database on Country and Lending Groups, 2010). 
6 
In regards to examining the differences between low-income and high-income countries, I will use the six 
individual governance indicators so that I can gain a better idea of which governance indicators in particular matter 
for low-income countries versus high-income countries. 
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literature: the first is the increasing gap in income inequality between the richest and poorest 
nations; and the second is the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of free nations. 
The gap in income inequality between nations is widening as the rich get richer and the poor 
become poorer. The sharp contrast between the standards of living illuminates this income 
inequality, which attracts the attention of governments, institutions, and economists. 
 Furthermore, the emergence of democratic, capitalist countries in Eastern Europe has 
increased interest in the causes of economic growth. Francis Fukuyama believed that ―the end of 
history…is the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government‖ (1989). Fukuyama claimed that the 
all nations would eventually converge towards democracy and that capitalism would be the 
prevailing economic system. Many believed that the Eastern European countries would liberalize 
by opening up their markets to international trade, deregulating their industries, decentralizing 
production, and allowing the privatization of different sectors of their economy. These actions, 
academics hypothesized, would foster economic growth in the former communist countries that 
had previously experienced very little, if any growth. However, several former communist 
nations, such as Moldova, have not grown economically since their emergence from the Soviet 
Union. This contradiction has puzzled academics, who have subsequently written many papers 
regarding the determinants of economic growth. With the United Nations’ Millennium Goals, the 
question of fostering economic growth is of even more importance in order for the goals to be 
met and the developing countries to climb out of poverty and achieve growth. 
 
Studies on Factors Other Than Governance that Influence Growth 
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 A significant amount of the literature attempts to explain the causes of economic growth 
by exploring various factors other than governance. These factors range from macroeconomic 
policy to ethnic fractionalization. Fischer (1993) looked at the effect that good macroeconomic 
policy has on the growth of an economy. He found that good macroeconomic policy, specifically 
a low inflation rate and a balanced budget, helps promote growth in a country, all other things 
being equal. In another study, Barro and Lee (1993) looked at the effect of education on growth. 
They found that more years of educational attainment correspond with a higher growth rate of 
real GDP per capita, indicating that an educated population can raise the growth rate of a 
country. King and Levine (1993) looked at the effect that a developed financial system has on a 
country’s economy. They researched its effect on promoting growth in an economy by the 
channels in which the financial system increases the productivity of the country’s workers and 
allows the country’s citizens access to capital. King and Levine found that the presence of a 
developed financial system in a country leads to faster growth. 
 Sachs, et al. (1995) used trade policy as a determinant of a country’s economic growth. In 
doing so, Sachs, et al. assessed the openness of a wide sample of countries and developed the 
Sachs and Warner ―openness dummy variable.‖ This variable, which incorporates many different 
dimensions of a country’s trade policy, is now widely used as a measure of a country’s openness. 
Sachs and Warner found that a developing country that is open to international trade tends to 
have a healthier economy and has more economic growth relative to a developing country that is 
closed. This led Sachs, et al. to conclude that ―trade policy should be viewed as the primary 
instrument of reform‖ (1995, p. 63). 
 Easterly and Levine (1996) wrote a paper that looked at ethnic fractionalization and its 
effect on growth in Africa. Finding a strong, positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization 
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and a poorly developed financial system and weak foreign exchange markets, Easterly and 
Levine concluded that ethnic diversity in developing countries hinders growth. Countries that are 
composed of many different ethnicities, none of which hold a clear majority, grow slower 
relative to countries that are predominately one ethnicity. This could be connected to the idea 
that ethnic fractionalization leads to a higher tendency for conflict and civil wars in a country 
because the many fractions fight over control and power of the country (Collier, p.32-5). These 
conflicts drain resources in the country as well as hinder any potential economic growth. As a 
result, these conflict-ridden countries grow relatively slower than stable countries. 
 
Studies on the Influence of Governance and Institutions on Growth 
 There has also been literature that researched the influence that institutions, governmental 
policies, and even governance have on the economic growth of countries. Hall and Jones (1999) 
studied the reasons why certain countries produce so much more output per capita relative to 
other countries. Using the Solow Growth Model, they found through their analysis that ―the large 
variation in output per worker across countries is only partially explained by differences in 
physical capital and educational attainment‖ (p.114). A bigger factor that affects the differences 
in output per worker across countries is the differences in institutions and governmental policies, 
which they called ―social infrastructure‖ (p.84). The different types of social infrastructure are 
the central reason for ―large differences in capital accumulation, educational attainment, and 
productivity, and therefore large differences in income across countries‖ (p.114). 
 Another study looked at the origins of institutions and their impact on the growth of the 
country’s economy. Acemoglu, et al. (2001) researched colonial governments and the type of 
state policy instituted there by the mother country. They found that ―Europeans adopted very 
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different colonization strategies, with different associated institutions‖ (p. 1395) depending on 
the geography of the colony. Colonies that were relatively closer to the equator had ―extractive 
states with the intention of transferring resources rapidly‖ to the mother country while those 
colonies farther away from the equator were more settled and had ―institutions that enforced the 
rule of law and encouraged investment‖ (Ibid.).  These differences in institutions and state 
policies depending on geography are at the root of large differences in income per capita across 
former colonies.
7
 The results from the analysis conducted by Acemoglu et al. suggest that 
substantial economic gains could be achieved from improving institutions in a given country 
(Ibid.). 
 As can be seen from this literature review, there is an extensive amount of literature on 
the causes and factors of economic growth. Two important papers, Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), are discussed in depth in the next section, which details the 
methodology used to construct the model used to determine the connection between governance 
and growth. Both of these papers, coupled with the Solow Growth Model, are the foundation for 
the model utilized in this paper. 
 
4. Methodology and Growth and Governance Equation 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) Growth Model 
 A seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) entitled ―Aid, Policies and Growth‖ 
looked at the role economic policies of a government play in the growth of a country’s economy. 
                                                          
7
 A note of caution is that there are reasons the Europeans implemented different institutions and state policies in 
colonies. Those closer to the equator had more diseases and Europeans were more susceptible to dying. Lower 
mortality rates as well as harsher living conditions and other exogenous factors play a large role in determining 
which style of government and policy the Europeans implemented in their colonies. For a good source detailing the 
importance of geography, refer to Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.  
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In their model, Burnside and Dollar go beyond Fischer’s study (1993) by using an index to 
measure economic policy, which consists of not only the country’s budget surplus and rate of 
inflation, but also includes the variable developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) to measure the 
country’s openness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, p. 2). Burnside and Dollar’s results showed that 
―aid has a positive impact on growth in a good policy environment‖ (p. 32). Thus, if a country 
has sound economic policies, then aid would allow that country to grow and develop. The 
ramifications of this study are that developing countries with good economic policies would 
benefit from aid and grow, bringing their people out of poverty. On the contrary, if a country did 
not have good policies, then any aid received by that country would be ―wasted aid.‖ 
 Burnside and Dollar had two separate equations in their economic analysis. First, they 
developed an equation for aid receipts relative to a country’s GDP. The aid term that they solve 
for in equation (1) is then used in the growth equation (2) for the country. The aid equation, 
shown in equation (1), captures the effect of the initial real GDP per capita, a vector of policies 
that affect growth, and a vector of other exogenous variables that affect growth and the allocation 
of aid. This equation can be expressed as: 
 
                   ait=yitγy+p'it γp+z'it γt+εit
a
                                                 (1) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
where,  i indexes countries, t indexes time 
yit is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP  
p'it is a Px1 vector of policies that affect growth  
z'it is a Kx1 vector of other exogenous variables that might affect growth and the 
allocation of aid 
εit
a
 is an error term 
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The growth equation (2) that Burnside and Dollar use has the aid equation along with the aid 
receipts relative to GDP, the initial GDP per capita, the policy and exogenous variables vectors, 
and aid receipts interacted with the vector of policies. 
 
                  git=yitβy+aitβa+p'itβp+aitp'itβ1+z'itβz+εit
g
                           (2) 
 
where,  i indexes countries, t indexes time 
git is per capita real GDP growth 
yit is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP  
ait is aid receipts relative to GDP  
p'it is a Px1 vector of policies that affect growth  
z'it is a Kx1 vector of other exogenous variables that might affect growth and the 
allocation of aid  
εit
g
 is a mean zero scalars 
The Burnside and Dollar equation (2000, p. 848) is based on a neoclassical growth model. Aid 
affects the growth model (2) in two separate ways. First, aid should have a positive effect on 
growth by raising the amount of money that a country can spend and invest, which is seen in the 
first aid term. Subsequently, aid affects growth through the interaction term with the vector of 
policies.  
 
Criticisms of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) Growth Model 
 There are many studies that contradict Burnside and Dollar’s conclusion, including 
Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), and 
Lensink and White (2001). Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), a leading dissenter against 
the Burnside and Dollar study, challenges their conclusion that good economic policies can 
positively affect growth. Easterly et al. updates the data set and expands it to include some 
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missing countries from Burnside and Dollar’s paper, including very poor African and Asian 
countries. With these countries included in the dataset, and using the same model and 
specifications of Burnside and Dollar’s study, Easterly et al. find that ―adding additional data to 
the [Burnside and Dollar] study of aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the effectiveness of 
aid and suggests that economists and policy makers should be less sanguine about concluding 
that foreign aid will boost growth in countries with good policies‖ (p. 789-80). A paper by 
Murphy and Tresp (2006) confirmed Easterly et al.’s results: ―the relationship among foreign 
aid, government policy, and economic growth is tenuous and depends heavily on the particular 
set of countries included in the analysis‖ (Murphy and Tresp, 2006, p. 10). 
 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) Governance and Growth Model 
 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) wrote a paper detailing the relationship between governance 
and economic growth, using the World Bank’s governance indicators as the measurement for 
governance and per capita income as the measurement for economic growth. They found 
correlation between governance and growth, and sought to establish the causal connection 
between governance and per capita income. They utilized a two-equation model to solve for this 
causal relationship between governance and per capita income. This first equation solves for 
governance, which is dependent ―on incomes, some other variables (x), and other factors outside 
the model (v)‖ (p.16). This equation can be seen below: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                  gj = µ + γ • yj + δ • xj + vj                                                     (3) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Kaufmann and Kraay use equation (3) to determine the feedback between governance and 
income per capita. 
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 The second equation used by Kaufmann and Kraay solves for the log per capita income, 
which ―depends on governance (g) and other factors‖ (Ibid.). This equation is the fundamental 
equation that Kaufmann and Kraay utilized to determine the causal effect. This equation can be 
seen as: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                 yj = α + β • gj + ej                                                                  (4) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Through their analysis, Kaufmann and Kraay found that ―governance matters significantly for 
growth in the very long run‖ (p.29). The correlation between governance and growth goes from 
better governance leading to higher per capita income (p.1). Conversely, there is ―a weak and 
even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to 
governance‖ (Ibid.). 
 These conclusions by Kaufmann and Kraay highlight the importance that governance has 
on economic growth. Furthermore, countries should not expect governance to improve as a 
byproduct of increased growth. Governance should be a precondition for a country seeking to 
grow. Good governance is necessary for economic development and raising the poor out of 
poverty; governance should be a main focus for countries, institutions, and organizations that are 
attempting to alleviate poverty and achieve the U.N.’s Millennium Goals. Furthermore, this 
paper sheds light on the importance of governance as well as the usability of the World Bank’s 
governance indicators. 
 
Solow Growth Model 
 As a theoretical framework for my growth equation, I use the Solow Growth Model. 
According to the Solow Growth Model, a country is in steady-state equilibrium when its capital 
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stock is no longer changing. Shown mathematically, this occurs when investment equals 
depreciation: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                  ∆k=γAk
α
-δk=0                                                                    (5) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
where,   k is capital per worker 
A is parameter measuring productivity—other things equal, a country with a 
higher A will produce more output relative to a country with a lower A 
γ is fraction of output that is invested 
α is parameter between 0 and 1 that determines how capital and labor are 
combined to produce output 
δ is rate of depreciation of the stock of capital  
An economy that is not in its steady state will move towards its steady-state equilibrium so that 
the level of depreciation of the capital stock is exactly equal to the growth of the capital stock. 
Thus, in the long-run, a country will maintain their capital stock. 
 If the initial starting point of the economy is below its steady state, the capital stock will 
increase until it reaches its steady-state level (denoted by k
ss
 in Figure 2). Similarly, if the initial 
starting point of the economy is above the steady-state level, then the capital stock for the 
country will contract until it reaches the equilibrium (see Figure 2). Once at the steady-state 
level, where depreciation equals investment, the change in capital is zero. With this concept, we 
find that if the rate of investment increases, then so does the steady-state level of output per 
worker; if the rate of depreciation increases, then the steady-state level of output per worker 
decreases. Analogous to this principle, if the governance of a country increases (meaning there is 
better governance), then the steady-state level of output per worker for the country will also 
increase, increasing GDP per capita. This implies that better governance in a country promotes 
economic growth. 
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 An important tenant of the Solow Growth Model is that the farther away an economy is 
from its steady state, the faster it will approach it (denoted in Figure 2 with the arrows on the x 
axis). As the economy approaches its steady-state level, its rate of growth will gradually 
decrease. Applying this principle to the growth and governance model, and by controlling for 
governance, we determine the location of a country’s steady-state level. It follows that a country 
with relatively worse governance will have a comparatively lower steady-state level. 
 
Governance and Growth Model 
 Although there are many papers critiquing the validity of the Burnside and Dollar study, 
their model is useful in evaluating growth in a country. Building upon the Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) model as well as the Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) model, and using the exogenous growth 
model, I estimate the impact that governance has on the growth for a given country, controlling 
for other factors affecting growth. My model, which I present later in this section, differs from 
the Burnside and Dollar (2000) equation because I add governance into the picture. It differs 
from the Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) equation because I not only add in factors such as trade 
and investment, but I also use an updated version of the World Bank’s governance indicators. 
 By using a fixed-effects panel data regression, I explore whether governance has any 
influence on growth. Building off of the methodology of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) equations, I explored various variables that have the potential to 
influence growth. The Solow Growth Model says that investment is key to increasing output per 
worker, which accordingly increases GDP per capita. The Burnside and Dollar (2000) model 
theorized that trade policy and aid receipts are key to the growth of a country’s GDP per capita. 
Lastly, the Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) model concluded that governance is central to increasing 
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per capita income. In the governance and growth equation (6), I include the aggregate 
governance indicator,
8
 a policy indicator,
9
 an indicator that captures the level of investment per 
capita of each country, and a country’s aid receipts per capita. This equation is seen as: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                  git= β0 + β1vit + β2tit + β3iit + β4ait + εit                                     (6) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
where,  i indexes countries, t indexes time 
git is real GDP per capita growth 
vit is the aggregate governance indicator 
tit is the growth of total trade per capita 
iit is the growth of investment per capita 
ait is the growth of aid receipts per capita 
εit is the error term 
 
The rationale for the growth equation is based on the hypothesis that growth in a country is 
determined by the different variables, namely the governance indicator as well as the growth of 
trade, investment, and aid receipts per capita. By including the most relevant and important 
variables, I am better able to see if, all other things being equal, governance indicators matter in 
regards to the economic growth of a country, controlling for economic policies, investment, or 
aid given to a country. 
 I also develop another governance and growth equation (7) that is more closely aligned to 
the Burnside and Dollar (2000) growth equation. This Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equation 
breaks the data into two, four-year periods
10
 and then summarizes all of the data for each 
variable. Initial GDP per capita, however, is the value for the respective start year of the two, 
four-year periods. This governance and growth equation contains all of the same variables in 
                                                          
8
 The aggregate governance indicator consists of the six different dimensions of governance as measured by the 
World Bank. 
9
 The policy indicator is the total amount of trade per capita. The idea here is that a country that has a larger amount 
of total trade per capita is relatively more open. 
10
 The two, four-year periods are 2000-2003 and 2004-2007. The years 1996-1999 and 2008 were omitted because 
there was a large amount of missing data. 
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equation (6) except it excludes total investment per capita while containing the initial GDP per 
capita. This equation can be seen as: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                  git= β0+β1yit+β2vit+β3tit+β4ait+εit                                              (7) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
where,  i indexes countries, t indexes time 
git is real GDP per capita growth 
yit is the initial GDP per capita 
vit is the aggregate governance indicator 
tit is the growth of total trade per capita 
ait is the growth of aid receipts per capita 
εit is the error term 
 
The growth of GDP per capita is the amount it grew during the four-year period. The rationale 
for this equation is that the starting point for each country is an important factor for the growth of 
that country. Each country’s growth in per capita GDP depends not only on the initial GDP per 
capita, but also on the other variables contained in the equation. 
 
Hypothesis 
 Do certain countries grow faster because of better governance relative to slower-growing 
countries? Furthermore, is good governance, as measured by the six indicators, a prerequisite for 
growth in a country? I hypothesize that good governance is in fact a prerequisite for economic 
growth; a country with relatively good governance has growing GDP per capita while a country 
with relatively bad governance is stagnant or declining in GDP per capita. Accordingly, the 
governance variable (vit) in both equation (5) and equation (6) will have a positive coefficient 
and will be statistically significant. This is especially important for promoting growth in 
developing countries to help eradicate the poverty and alleviate malnutrition, hunger, and 
preventable diseases, thereby helping achieve the ambitious United Nations’ Millennium Goals. 
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5. Data and Statistical Issues 
Governance Indicators 
 For the governance indicators, I use the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. The effectiveness of a government can be measured by its governance. Governance, 
as defined by the World Bank’s WGI project, is 
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them 
(Kaufmann, et al., 2009, p. 5). 
 
While there are quite a few different organizations and institutions that collect governance 
indicators of countries, the governance database developed by the WGI project is the one I 
selected to use in this paper. This database has observations for 212 countries for ten time 
periods from 1996 until 2008.
11
 The WGI project, which is part of the World Bank, measures six 
different dimensions of governance. These six dimensions are: voice and accountability; political 
stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption.
12
 
Voice and Accountability: Voice and accountability, the first dimension, measures the degree to 
which the people of a country are able to freely partake in their country’s government. This 
includes the extent to which citizens possess the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, 
freedom of press, and freedom to assemble. 
                                                          
11
 The time periods between 1996 and 2008 are: 1996, 1998, 2000, and from 2002 until 2008.  See Table 3 for a list 
of all of the countries present in the WGI’s governance database, which are the countries that I use when I collect 
the rest of the variables. 
12
 See Table 4 for the World Bank’s summary statistics on the six individual governance indicators. 
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Political Stability and Absence of Violence: This dimension captures the amount of stability in 
a country. It also incorporates the citizens’ expectations for future political unrest. Any violence 
or terrorism in a country that is due to the country’s political institutions or regimes decreases 
this indicator’s average. 
Government Effectiveness: Government effectiveness gauges the ―perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies‖ (Ibid., p. 6). 
Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government institutions to 
control and regulate the private sector. It also captures the perceptions of the ability of the 
government to foster development in the private sector through regulation. 
Rule of Law: This measurement of governance captures the perceptions that citizens have in 
their country’s institutions in enforcing the laws and the effectiveness of which a country does it. 
It also measures ―the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence‖ (Ibid.). 
Control of Corruption: The last dimension of governance, control of corruption, assesses the 
perception of corruption in the governmental institutions. It also accounts for the perception of 
the state giving resources and contracts to private individuals and companies because of 
connections or money. 
 For each of these six dimensions of governance, a number of sources are gathered for the 
data on the countries, including surveys, governments, and nongovernmental organizations. The 
WGI project then uses ―a statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model to 
construct aggregate indicators‖ for each of the six governance indicators for the 212 countries. 
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The estimates for each of the six indicators lay between -2.5 and 2.5.
13
 The methodology used by 
the WGI project also produces a standard error of one for the governance indicators for all of the 
countries. Each country in the dataset is also given a relative ranking among all other countries 
for the six different dimensions. A country with a relatively higher governance indicator has a 
better level of governance relative to countries with a lower score. Since the governance 
indicators that are measured follow a standard normal distribution, it implies that the ―aggregate 
estimates [for each of the six components] convey no information about trends in global averages 
of governance‖ but instead express the ―changes in individual countries’ relative positions over 
time‖ (Kaufmann, et al., p.15). 
 The aggregate governance indicator that I construct for each country measures the 
weighted average of each of the variables for that respective country. For each year, I averaged 
the six individual governance indicators for each respective country. For the missing years of 
1997, 1999, and 2001, I averaged the governance indicators from the year before and the year 
after. While this does not give a totally accurate measure of governance for that given year, it 
does allow me to expand the number of observations within each group when I begin the 
statistical work. I use equation (6) in two different ways in respect to the governance indicator: 
first, I use the aggregated governance indicator that is composed of the weighted average of the 
six individual governance indicators; and secondly, I use each of the six individual governance 
indicators. The weighted average is employed to determine the effect that aggregate governance 
has on economic growth of a country; the individual components are used to see whether or not 
                                                          
13
 According to Kaufmann, et al. (2009), the boundaries of -2.5 and 2.5 ―correspond to the 0.005 and 0.995 
percentiles of the standard normal distribution‖ (p.15). Thus, there are a few cases in which the country has an 
extremely good or bad governance level, and the governance indicator therefore lies outside of this range. 
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specific governance indicators are associated with economic growth, and if so, which governance 
indicators are most closely linked with economic growth. 
 
Other Variables 
 Besides governance indicators, I used several other variables from various databases and 
sites. For consistency, I used the 212 countries listed in Table 3 in the collection of these 
variables – the same countries that the WGI project collected data for governance. To determine 
the growth rate of GDP per capita for each of the countries, I used the GDP variable from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators (WDI). The variable I used was in current 
U.S. dollars; to get the values into a real value, I employed the GDP deflators from the 
International Monetary Fund for each country to get a base year of 2005.  Accordingly, all values 
for GDP per capita, as well as total trade per capita, investment per capita, and aid receipts per 
capita are in 2005 U.S. dollars. To get the real GDP per capita, I use the World Bank’s estimate 
of population. 
 Likewise, I apply similar techniques to the rest of the variables in my model. The policy 
variable, which is total trade, is composed of the World Trade Organization’s data, and is 
compiled by adding total exports and imports for each country for the given year. I then deflate 
each year to get 2005 as the base year in U.S. dollars, and divide the value by the population 
estimator from the World Bank. This variable is designed to determine the country’s level of 
openness. I expect countries that relatively more open to have a larger amount of total trade per 
capita. I utilize the gross capital formation variable from the United Nations database. This 
allows me to get total investment, since the gross capital formation is the part of the GDP of each 
country that is investment. Similar to total trade and GDP, I deflate each year and then divide it 
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by the population to get real investment per capita for each country in 2005 U.S. dollars.  My last 
variable, aid receipts, is from the World Bank. After deflating each year and dividing it by the 
population, I obtain real aid receipts per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 Table 5 in the Appendix contains the summary statistics for the data that I used in my 
model. The statistics for the six categories include all 212 countries except GDP per capita. I 
excluded the following countries: Angola, Belarus, Congo Democratic Republic, and 
Luxembourg. The first three countries were left out of GDP per capita because of severe 
hyperinflation, which skewed the mean upwards and inflated the standard deviation. 
Luxembourg, on the other hand, was excluded in the summary of GDP per capita because of its 
high GDP per capita, which skewed the mean upwards and increased the standard deviation. 
These four countries were complete outliers in summarizing GDP per capita. 
 As you can infer from Table 5, the mean aggregate governance indicator is slightly 
negative, reflecting the standard normal curve with a mean of zero. One reason the actual mean 
may be a bit off from zero is that I took the average of the six individual governance indicators, 
thereby altering the actual normal curve. An interesting and important aspect of Table 5 that one 
should notice is that low-income countries,
14
 which by definition have a relatively low median 
GDP per capita, also experienced a negative growth rate during the period for which I collected 
data: 1996 through 2008. While this may be expected, this means that low-income countries are 
not, on average, increasing their GDP per capita, but rather their income per capita is further 
decreasing. Furthermore, these low-income countries’ aggregate governance indicator is 
                                                          
14
 Refer to Table 1 for a list of these low-income countries. 
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negative, suggesting that governance is in fact associated with the level of income as well as the 
growth rate of per capita GDP. Similarly, high-income countries
15
 have a positive growth rate of 
GDP per capita, meaning that on average, these countries’ GDP per capita is increasing each 
year. High-income countries also have a relatively high mean and median aggregate governance 
indicator, implying that governance is linked with the level of income and growth rate of a 
country. 
 The growth rate of total trade per capita is increasing for all observations and high-
income countries, but yet is decreasing for low-income countries. This highlights the fact that 
trade is somehow correlated with growth of GDP per capita and has an impact on the level of 
income per capita. The mean growth rate of investment is positive for high-income countries, but 
is shrinking for all observations as well as low-income countries. This implies that investment in 
a country is an important factor in promoting economic growth and increasing the level of GDP 
per capita in a country. The growth rate of aid receipts per capita is decreasing for all three 
subsets, indicating that it may potentially be unimportant in regards to promoting economic 
growth. Lastly, the standard deviation for the growth rate of GDP per capita, aggregate 
governance indicator, total trade per capita, and investment per capita is higher for low-income 
countries relative to high-income countries. This is expected since there is more variation in the 
low-income countries due to the instability that poorer countries experience. Likewise, in regards 
to aid receipts per capita, the standard deviation is relatively higher for high-income countries 
since the majority of high-income countries are not receiving any aid, but rather are the ones 
giving the aid. 
                                                          
15
 Refer to Table 2 for a list of these high-income countries. 
Walton 25 
 
 In Figure 3, I plotted the governance in each country in 1996 against the normalized 
growth rate of GDP per capita from 1996 to 2008. As one can infer from this graph, there is a 
positive correlation between the beginning level of governance and the economic growth of a 
country. Countries that started this period with a relatively higher aggregate governance indicator 
on average had a relatively higher growth rate of GDP per capita during the sample period, 
holding everything else equal. Similarly, Figure 4 plots the governance in each country in 2008 
against the normalized growth rate of GDP per capita from 1996 to 2008. This graph shows that 
there is also a positive correlation between the ending level of governance in each country and 
the growth rate of GDP per capita. With all other things being equal, countries that ended the 
sample period with a relatively higher aggregate governance level had relatively higher growth 
rates of per capita GDP. 
 The change in the aggregate governance indicator between 1996 and 2008 plotted against 
the normalized growth rate of GDP per capita from 1996 to 2008 also shows the positive 
relationship between governance and growth, as seen in Figure 5. While there are some outlying 
countries, the majority of countries are centered near the middle of the graph. Furthermore, there 
is a positive relationship between the growth of governance and the growth of per capita GDP. 
This implies that a positive change in governance over the sample period is linked to a growth in 
GDP per capita. To get a better idea of this relationship, Figure 6 eliminates the outliers and 
zooms in on the center of the graph. One can see in this figure the positive relationship between 
the change in governance and the growth rate of GDP per capita. As Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2002) stated in their paper Growth Without Governance, there is ―a strong positive causal effect 
running from better governance to higher per capita income‖ (p.1); this can clearly be seen in 
Figure 6. A possible conclusion from this figure is that countries whose governance is increasing 
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have higher growth rates of per capita GDP than countries whose governance is stagnant or 
declining. Moreover, countries that have increasing governance have relatively higher incomes 
per capita. 
 
Statistical Issues 
 The biggest problem encountered in my model and data set is the number of years that I 
have full and complete data. Economic growth takes time to impact a country; economic growth 
that is caused by forces today may not be felt in the country for some time. Accordingly, a study 
on economic growth should utilize a time period that is relatively long, whereas my data set is 
limited due to the availability of the governance data from the World Bank. The WGI database 
only has data for the past thirteen years. Furthermore, five of those years have numerous missing 
variables, which create problems when I attempt to regress my model. While I work with the 
data that I have, it may be an interesting exercise to replicate this model as more data becomes 
available in future years. 
 My equation, which is a panel data model, varies over both time t and country i for each 
observation. The error term for each observation is incorporated into the model as εit. While this 
error term captures the rest of the variables that I do not account for in my model, I must analyze 
it for each observation. Since the timeframe of the data set is small, covering only thirteen years, 
it is likely that the sources of heterogeneity for the countries remain for more than one period. 
Variables, such as educational attainment, can affect the economic growth of a country: if a 
country is relatively more educated, foreign investment could be attracted, investment could rise, 
and more jobs could be formed, raising the economic growth of the country. Educational 
attainment is unlikely to fluctuate and change drastically over thirteen years. Therefore, since I 
Walton 27 
 
did not capture this as a variable in my equation, it is likely that this will remain constant in the 
error term for each observation i over the sample period. 
 Furthermore, these unobserved terms that are incorporated into the error term are likely to 
be correlated, whether positively or negatively, with the independent variables. To control for 
this correlation between the unobserved variables and the independent variables, I abandon the 
random effects model in favor of the unobserved effects model, or more commonly, the fixed 
effects model.
16
 In my model, the error term εit encompasses overlooked factors that change with 
both time and country. By running a fixed effects model, I am now able to accurately capture any 
bias created by the unobserved variables that caused heterogeneity in my model. Any 
explanatory power from variables such as educational attainment is now better contained in the 
error term. 
 
6. Regression Results 
 I ran twelve regressions, whose results can be seen in Tables 6, 7, and 8 in the Appendix. 
The first set of regressions in Table 6 use the aggregate governance indicator. The second set of 
regressions in Table 7 use the six individual governance indicators. I also explore the differences 
between low-income and high-income countries in this set. Finally, the last regression in Table 8 
is modeled after the Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper. 
 
Regressions Involving the Aggregate Governance Indicator 
                                                          
16
 To determine which was better for my model, fixed effects or random effects, I ran a Hausman specification test. 
The result was that I had to reject the null hypothesis of random effects in favor of fixed effects. 
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 Regression 1, modeled after equation (6), is a binary regression of growth of GDP per 
capita
17
 on governance. The purpose of this regression was to analyze the association between 
governance and growth of per capita GDP, holding everything else equal in the error term. 
Governance was statistically significant at the 1% level, signaling the importance of governance 
in regards to economic growth. The coefficient on governance was positive, which was expected; 
this implies that an increase in governance is associated with an increase in GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, an increase in the aggregate level of governance
18
 is be linked with an increase in 
the country’s growth of GDP per capita, significantly raising the income level of the country’s 
inhabitants.
19
 However, this binary regression is only capturing around 4 percent of the variance, 
indicating that there are missing elements in my equation. 
 Regression 2 sought to capture more of the variance in the model as well as incorporate 
Burnside and Dollar’s idea of a policy variable. I add in the growth of total trade per capita and 
regressed growth of GDP per capita on this policy variable as well as governance. Governance 
remains statistically significant at the 5% level with a positive coefficient, still indicating that 
governance and economic growth are linked with each other. The growth of total trade per capita 
is statistically significant at the 1% level and has a positive coefficient. A 1 percent increase in 
the growth of total trade per capita is correlated with a 0.74 percent increase in the growth of 
income per capita. This regression captures a significantly larger amount of the variance than the 
                                                          
17
 The growth of GDP per capita, total trade per capita, investment per capita, and aid receipts per capita in 
regressions 1 through 11 was found by taking the natural log of each value, and then subtracting the previous year 
from it. This allowed me to obtain a more normalized growth rate for each of the variables. Accordingly, bear this 
method in mind as you read the results section and browse the tables in the appendix. 
18
 Since the governance indicators are measured between -2.5 and 2.5, a 1 percent increase in the level of 
governance would be associated with around a 0.05 increase in the level of governance. Taking a look at the 
aggregate data, this change is not uncommon in countries over a span of several years, or even in one year in some 
instances. 
19
 A 20.72 percent increase in governance, which is the change from the median (50
th
 percentile) to the 80
th
 
percentile, is associated with a 334.84 percent increase in the growth of GDP per capita. 
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previous equation. Within each of the 177 countries, 61 percent of the variance is being 
explained with this two-variable regression; between the countries, the equation explains nearly 
80 percent of the variance. Overall, regression 2 explains just over 65 percent of the variance. 
 I continue to add more variables to the model in regressions 3 and 4. I first add the 
growth of investment per capita, finding that both it and the growth of total trade per capita are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and positively correlated with the growth of income per 
capita. An important feature of regression 3, however, is that with the addition of investment, 
governance no longer was statistically significant. A possible reason for governance no longer 
being statistically significant is that both trade and investment, which appear to capture much of 
the variance, dwarf governance and are strongly correlated with economic growth and each 
other. Another possible theory is that governance is affecting both the growth of income per 
capita as well as the growth of trade and investment. This will be explored further in the next 
section. In regression 4, I add the growth of aid receipts per capita to the model. Governance 
stays statistically insignificant while the growth of total trade and investment per capita remain 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The growth of aid receipts per capita is statistically 
insignificant; it also does not add much explanatory power to the variance, only barely raising 
the R-squared. For these reasons, I decide to exclude the growth of aid receipts per capita in the 
remaining equations, noting its triviality. 
 For regressions 5 and 6, I dropped five years – 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2008 – due 
to large a large amount of missing data. I also exclude any countries that had missing data for at 
least one of the eight years left in my data set. Thus, the 160 countries in these two regressions 
have full and complete data for the period 2000 through 2007. In regression 5, I used this smaller 
data set to regress growth of GDP per capita on governance and growth of total trade per capita. 
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The results showed that governance is statistically significant at the 10% level and that the 
growth of trade is statistically significant at the 1% level. Both have positive coefficients, 
denoting a positive relationship between the growth of GDP per capita and the two independent 
variables. The growth of investment per capita is inserted into the model in regression 6. Once 
again, this addition into the model causes governance to become statistically insignificant; 
growth of total trade per capita and growth of investment per capita remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level and have positive coefficients.
20
 
 
Regressions Involving the Six Individual Governance Indicators 
 The second set of regressions, as seen in Table 7, include the same variables as the first 
set of regressions in Table 6, except that the aggregate governance indicator is split into its six 
individual components. This allows me to isolate each of the components of governance and 
determine if certain aspects of governance have greater significance relative to others. I first 
regressed the growth of GDP per capita on the six different governance indicators: voice and 
accountability, political stability/absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Political stability/absence of violence, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law were all statistically significant at the 1% level. An interesting result, 
however, was that rule of law had a negative coefficient, which runs counter-intuitive and against 
my hypothesis. An increase in a given country’s rule of law is associated with a decline in that 
country’s growth of GDP per capita.21 Possible explanations for this phenomenon will be 
explored in the conclusion section that focuses on the six individual governance indicators. Both 
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 I excluded the variable Aid from this smaller set of countries with a full set of data due to its insignificance and 
little explanatory power. I exclude Aid from future regressions due to these two reasons. 
21
 A 20.67 percent increase in a country’s rule of law, which would move that country from the 50 th percentile to the 
80
th
 percentile, is associated with a 196.16 percent decrease in their growth of per capita GDP. 
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political stability/absence of violence and regulatory quality had positive coefficients, 
reaffirming my hypothesis that an increase in governance is connected with an increase in the 
level of income. 
 In order to capture a larger portion of the variance, I once again add the growth of total 
trade per capita into the equation, as seen in regression 8, and then the growth of investment per 
capita, as seen in regression 9. When trade is added, regulatory quality remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level with a positive coefficient. Control of corruption becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level, but similar to the rule of law variable in regression 7, has a negative 
coefficient. This insinuates that, as a country controls its corruption, they grow relatively slower; 
this idea will be looked into further in the following section. The growth of total trade per capita 
is once again statistically significant at the 1% level with a positive coefficient in regression 8, as 
well as in regression 9 when investment is added to the model. With the growth of investment 
per capita included in the model, regulatory quality and control of corruption are both still 
statistically significantly at the 1% level; political stability/absence of violence also becomes 
statistically significant at the 5% level. While regulatory quality and political stability/absence of 
violence have positive coefficients, control of corruption continues to befuddle my hypothesis 
with a negative coefficient. Investment is statistically significant at the 1% level with a positive 
coefficient, further signaling its importance in regards to growth of per capita GDP. 
 I then turn to the issue of whether governance is relatively more important for low-
income countries versus high-income countries, and which governance indicators matter for each 
group of countries. In regression 10, I regressed growth of GDP per capita on the six individual 
governance indicators along with the growth of total trade and investment per capita for only the 
low-income countries. The only governance indicator that was statistically significant was 
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control of corruption, which was significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, control of corruption 
had a negative coefficient, implying that an increase in the control of corruption in a given 
country is connected with a decline in the country’s growth of GDP per capita.22 As seen in this 
regression, the anomaly that control of corruption is presenting is specific to low-income 
countries that are not experiencing economic growth. This result also suggests that, in order to 
stimulate growth in these poor countries, one should not attempt to curb corruption. Regression 
11, which was the same regression as 10 except on high-income countries, had one governance 
indicator that was statistically significant: regulatory quality. Significant at the 1% level, an 
increase in regulatory quality is linked with an increase in the growth of per capita GDP,
23
 
signaling its importance for stimulating growth in the richer countries. 
 
Regression Modeled After Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
 Regression 12 is modeled off of equation (7) and the Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper. I 
dropped the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2008 due to missing data. I then split the time 
period of 2000 through 2007 into two, four-year periods. I regressed the growth of GDP per 
capita across this 8-year period on initial GDP per capita,
24
 aggregate governance indicator, 
average natural log of aid receipts per capita, and average natural log of total trade per capita 
over the two four-year periods. Governance remained statistically insignificant, bearing no 
association with the growth of per capita GDP. The initial GDP per capita and aid per capita are 
both statistically significant at the 1% level. However, a 1 percent increase in the initial GDP per 
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 If a country at the 50
th
 percentile in regards to control of corruption increases to the 80
th
 percentile, their growth of 
GDP per capita on average would decline by 228.19 percent.  
23
 An increase of 19.56 percent in regulatory quality, which would increase a country from the 50
th
 percentile to the 
80
th
 percentile, is associated with a 163.91 increase in the growth of per capita GDP. 
24
 The initial GDP per capita for the given country i would be either the 2000 GDP per capita or the 2004 GDP per 
capita, depending on which period it is for the country. 
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capita is associated with a 0.00 percent decrease in the growth of GDP per capita. Trade per 
capita is statistically significant at the 5% level with a positive coefficient, signifying their 
positive correlation. This equation did not capture much of the variance, with the adjusted R-
squared only being 11.52 percent. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This study produced both expected results as well as results that go against my 
hypothesis. By utilizing the fixed-effects regression model, I was able to determine the 
association between a country’s governance and their economic growth. I found that good 
governance is in fact associated with the growth of GDP per capita. Furthermore, the growth of 
total trade per capita and growth of investment per capita are both statistically significant in 
every regression and are positively associated with a country’s growth of per capita GDP. Lastly, 
the growth of aid receipts per capita does not appear to be significantly connected with the 
growth of GDP per capita. These conclusions all lead to important implications for 
policymakers, institutions, and organizations that seek to promote economic growth in poor and 
developing countries. 
 
Aggregate Governance Indicator 
 I conclude that overall governance is important for economic growth and is positively 
linked with the growth of GDP per capita. By itself in regression 1, the aggregate governance 
indicator was statistically significant at the 1% level. As more variables are introduced into the 
model, governance’s statistical significance eventually diminishes; however, I speculate that this 
is partly due to a large correlation between governance and trade and governance and 
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investment, as well as between trade and investment. This multicollinearity could reduce its 
significance in the regression, but the importance of governance would still remain. I also believe 
that governance affects growth through two channels: first, good governance helps lay the 
foundation for growth and is accordingly so, a prerequisite for growth; and secondly, good 
governance positively affects trade and investment, which then in turn promote economic 
growth. 
 Since governance affects the growth of GDP per capita directly and indirectly, a larger 
emphasis should be placed on improving the governance of developing countries in order to 
stimulate economic growth. A small improvement in governance has a multiplier effect that is 
experienced through the two separate channels. This impact on growth by a country’s 
governance is substantial and deserves the attention and resources of the countries and 
institutions working towards the development goals of the United Nations. Furthermore, 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) support the need to place a larger emphasis on reforming 
governance. Kaufmann and Kraay argue that ―substantial and ongoing interventions to improve 
governance are required in order to design governance and institutional reform strategies‖ (Ibid.). 
Consequently, Wolfensohn’s plea in 2001 to aid in the achievement of the development goals 
should have been focused towards improving governance rather than giving more aid money;
25
 
economic growth can only occur after good governance is established. 
 
Individual Governance Indicators 
 Breaking the aggregate governance indicator down into the six individual components 
brings some surprising results. First, voice and accountability as well as government 
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 Furthermore, as I will discuss later in this section, my analysis has shown that aid does not affect the growth of 
GDP per capita. Thus, giving more aid will not benefit the developing countries. 
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effectiveness are never statistically significant. Political stability/absence of violence is 
statistically significant in regressions 7 and 9; there is a positive correlation between this variable 
and the growth of GDP per capita. From this, I conclude that violence is a hindrance and barrier 
to economic growth. This is rather intuitive, since violence prevents economic development and 
increases the costs for safety. Furthermore, violence detracts from productive uses that would 
augment the country’s GDP. 
 Another important component of governance is regulatory quality. This variable was 
statistically significant at the 1% level in regressions 7, 8, 9, and 11. It consistently bears a 
positive coefficient; a positive increase in the regulatory quality of a country is linked with a 
positive increase in the growth of that country’s GDP per capita.26 According to Kaufmann, et al 
(2009), the regulatory quality of a government is the decisions that allow the creation and 
implementation of policies that promote private sector development (p.6). The importance of this 
in promoting economic growth makes sense: the encouragement of the private sector 
development leads to the creation of jobs and output, which leads to increases in the income 
level and standards of living, bringing the people of developing nations out of poverty. 
Governments wishing to grow should attempt to reform their regulatory environment so as to 
promote development which will in return influence economic growth. Furthermore, the second 
channel of governance – through trade and investment – is seen here. An improvement in the 
governance aspect of regulatory quality leads to an increase in the growth of investment and 
trade; an increase in investment and trade affects the growth rate of GDP per capita by increasing 
it. The direct and indirect manner that governance influences economic growth can occur 
                                                          
26
 A 19.56 percent increase in the regulatory quality of a country, which is the change from the 50
th
 percentile to the 
80
th
 percentile, is linked with between a 79.41 percent and 273.64 percent increase in the growth of that country’s 
GDP per capita. 
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simultaneously with the increase in investment in the private sector due to a reformed regulatory 
policy. This illustrates the two different ways that governance impacts economic growth. 
 While regulatory quality had a positive correlation with economic growth, rule of law and 
control of corruption had a negative association. Rule of law was statistically significant in 
regression 7 and had a negative coefficient, implying that a better rule of law results in a lower 
growth rate. Similarly, control of corruption was statistically significant in regressions 8, 9, and 
10 and also had a negative coefficient. I speculate that either an increase in a country’s rule of 
law or less corruption in the country results in lower growth for two reasons. First, customs and 
traditions in a country are changed with increases in the rule of law or control of corruption. 
Oftentimes, changes in either of these governance components coincide with changes in how 
people in the country go about doing business. An example would be more bureaucratic 
loopholes that temporary slows or halts the growth of the country’s economy for a period of time 
until the citizens adjusted to this change in law. A second possibility for these surprising results 
is the idea of a ―trickle-down‖ effect that corruption and a poor rule of law has on a country and 
its economy. When the leaders of a government pocket much of the state income, whether by 
diverting tax and aid money or receiving government contracts for resources, the poor directly 
lose. However, if these rich elite spend the money in the domestic economy and hire people, than 
the economy could be positively affected from the corruption and poor rule of law.
27
 
 
Growth of Trade per Capita 
                                                          
27
 It should be noted, however, that generally, the elite funnel the money abroad by investing in international 
organizations. Rarely do they invest domestically due to a lack of physical capital and educated workforce. This 
does present a problem to my reasoning on why an increase in control of corruption and rule of law leads to a 
decrease in the growth of GDP per capita. 
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 The growth in total trade per capita explains a significant portion of the variation of 
growth. More importantly, the growth of total trade per capita is always statistically significant at 
the 1% level and has a positive correlation with the growth of GDP per capita. A 1 percent 
increase in the growth of total trade per capita is linked with an increase between 0.48 and 0.74 
percent in the growth rate of income per capita. The growth of total trade per capita is also highly 
correlated with the growth of investment per capita, causing some collinearity between the two 
variables which may skew the data. The idea that trade is strongly connected to a country’s 
growth of GDP per capita is somewhat intuitive and the relationship can go both ways. As a 
country’s output grows, it is more easily able to export and its citizens have a greater demand for 
imports, thus causing total trade to increase as well. Going the other way, a country that 
increases its trade is likely to develop a comparative advantage and borrow new technologies, 
furthering its productivity and increasing output per worker. Policies designed to promote trade 
should therefore be encouraged and the government should attempt to create an environment 
conducive for investing and trading. This further highlights the importance of governance in 
regards to growth of a country. 
 
Growth of Investment per Capita 
 Similar to total trade, the growth of investment per capita is statistically significant at the 
1% level in every regression that it is present. Furthermore, it highly correlated with both the 
growth of GDP per capita as well as the growth of total trade per capita. As investment per capita 
rises in a country, its output per capita also rises. This goes along with my hypothesis and the 
Solow Growth Model: investment is crucial to increasing output per worker. An important tenant 
of this conclusion is that governments can influence the amount of investment that their country 
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receives by creating favorable policy structures and frameworks that attract foreign investors and 
retain domestic investors. As a country attracts more investment, jobs will be created and output 
will increase, leading to higher incomes and better standards of living; this economic growth will 
assist the country in their flight against poverty. As a result, governance is of the utmost 
importance in attracting investment and lifting their people out of poverty. 
 
Growth of Aid Receipts per Capita 
 I find that the growth of aid receipts per capita explains very little variation in the growth 
of GDP per capita in my model and is statistically insignificant. This leads me to conclude that 
aid is insignificant for the growth of per capita GDP and does not help promote the growth of a 
country’s economy. Although I controlled for governance in my model, governance may have an 
interaction with the efficiency of aid. Furthermore, governance and its interaction with aid may 
not be properly captured in my governance variable that uses the World Bank’s data. Keeping 
this in mind, one possible theory for my conclusion in regards to the growth of aid receipts per 
capita is that aid is generally given to countries with bad governance, which then squander the 
money away and do not use the aid for productive means. This ―wasted aid‖ is not given the 
opportunity to promote growth in these countries since corruption and violence are so high and 
rule of law and a regulatory environment are practically nonexistent. This could imply that 
countries and institutions who desire to promote growth in developing countries should focus on 
improving the governance in the developing country before giving large amounts of aid to them. 
This goes contrary to much of the current literature and viewpoint among both policymakers and 
economists. Therefore, this issue needs to be further researched and studied to determine whether 
aid does benefit countries, or if my results are confirmed and aid does not promote growth. 
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Figure 2: Solow Growth Model: Steady-State Graph 
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Table 1: List of Low-Income Countries 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: List of High-Income Countries 
Andorra 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Bermuda 
Brunei 
Canada 
Cayman Islands 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Equatorial Guinea 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guam 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, South 
Kuwait 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Malta 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Oman 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
San Marino 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Source: World Bank  
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea Guinea-Bisau 
Haiti 
Kenya 
Korea, North 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Table 3: List of Countries Used in Data Set 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Andorra 
Angola 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Columbia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Cote D’Ivorie 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El  Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Guiana 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guam 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, North 
Korea, South 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Reunion 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Source: World Bank  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Governance Indicators 
Number of 
Countries 
VA PS/AV GE RQ ROL CC Average 
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
194 
199 
200 
201 
201 
208 
208 
209 
209 
209 
180 
189 
190 
190 
200 
207 
208 
209 
209 
210 
182 
194 
196 
202 
202 
209 
209 
212 
212 
212 
183 
194 
196 
197 
197 
204 
204 
206 
207 
208 
171 
194 
196 
197 
202 
209 
209 
211 
211 
210 
154 
194 
196 
197 
198 
205 
205 
207 
208 
208 
177 
194 
196 
197 
200 
207 
207 
209 
209 
210 
        
Median Number of Sources Per Country     
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
4 
5 
5 
7 
7 
8 
8 
10 
10 
12 
4 
5 
5 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
9 
4 
5 
5 
8 
9 
9 
9 
11 
11 
10 
4 
5 
6 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
9 
9 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
11 
11 
13 
13 
13 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
9 
11 
11 
11 
4 
5 
6 
8 
8 
9 
9 
10 
10 
11 
        
Proportion of Countries with Only One Data Source  
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
15 
11 
11 
10 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
16 
7 
8 
7 
10 
6 
5 
3 
3 
4 
21 
10 
8 
5 
5 
8 
8 
9 
8 
8 
11 
10 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
9 
6 
9 
7 
7 
5 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
18 
10 
8 
8 
7 
8 
7 
8 
8 
8 
14 
10 
8 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
        
Average Standard Error  
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
0.25 
0.27 
0.26 
0.21 
0.20 
0.21 
0.20 
0.20 
0.17 
0.17 
0.38 
0.30 
0.31 
0.29 
0.29 
0.28 
0.28 
0.26 
0.25 
0.25 
0.34 
0.16 
0.21 
0.23 
0.22 
0.22 
0.21 
0.22 
0.24 
0.23 
0.41 
0.30 
0.28 
0.25 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.22 
0.21 
0.30 
0.23 
0.19 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.18 
0.33 
0.25 
0.24 
0.22 
0.21 
0.20 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.20 
0.34 
0.25 
0.25 
0.23 
0.22 
0.22 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
Source: Kaufmann, et al. (2009)  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics on Data 
 GDP per 
Capita (in 
2005 US$) 
Growth Rate of GDP 
per Capita (percent 
per annum) 
Aggregate 
Governance 
Indicators 
Growth Rate of Total 
Trade per Capita (per 
cent per annum) 
Growth Rate of Total 
Investment per Capita 
(percent per annum) 
Growth Rate of ODA 
per Capita (percent 
per annum) 
All 
Observations 
***      
    Mean $8,465.20 -1.06% -0.0261 0.84% -0.40% -7.35% 
    Median $2,851.89 1.69% -0.1795 3.24% 2.80% -6.31% 
    Standard   
    Deviation 
$12,194.23 18.88% 0.9354 19.91% 26.27% 57.32% 
    Minimum $102.39 -230.14% -2.4992 -235.69% -215.50% -422.17% 
    Maximum $77,614.40 116.86% 1.9561 69.00% 109.66% 360.04% 
Low-Income 
Countries 
      
    Mean $549.74 -5.56% -0.8985 -3.46% -3.86% -7.44% 
    Median $404.17 -1.20% -0.8653 -0.03% 1.17% -5.25% 
    Standard  
    Deviation 
$729.83 23.79% 0.5195 25.91% 32.44% 34.54% 
    Minimum $102.39 -198.82% -2.4992 -231.67% -191.00% -165.71% 
    Maximum $11,360.54 116.86% 0.0944 69.00% 109.66% 137.57% 
High-Income 
Countries 
      
    Mean $25,008.30 3.55% 1.0418 5.18% 3.40% -2.93% 
    Median $24,865.95 2.84% 1.1384 5.17% 4.48% -4.05% 
    Standard  
    Deviation 
$13,145.67 9.74% 0.6228 9.92% 16.38% 95.86% 
    Minimum $1,098.91 -46.64% -1.2899 -33.82% -82.96% -369.05% 
    Maximum $77,614.40 76.18% 1.9561 59.89% 62.67% 360.04% 
Source: Author’s Calculations  
Walton 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s Calculations 
  
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
G
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
 o
f 
1
9
9
6
 
Normalized Growth Rate of  GDP per Capita from 1996 to 2008 
Figure 3: Governance in 1996 vs. Growth 
Rate of GDP per Capita 
Walton 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4: Governance in 2008 vs. Growth 
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 Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 5: Change in Governance vs. 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita 
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 Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 6: Change in Governance vs. 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita 
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Table 6: OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regressions for Growth 
Regression No. 
Observations 
Groups 
1 
2035 
178 
2 
2025 
177 
3 
2007 
176 
4 
1469 
152 
5 
1280 
160 
6 
1280 
160 
Constant -0.0052 
(0.0039) 
-0.0160*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0136*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0160** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0132*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0114*** 
(0.0027) 
Governance 0.1616*** 
(0.0290) 
0.0397** 
(0.0184) 
0.0161 
(0.0165) 
0.0032 
(0.0210) 
0.0464* 
(0.0256) 
0.0171 
(0.0233) 
Growth of Trade ---- 0.7358*** 
(0.0138) 
0.5297*** 
(0.0164) 
0.5234*** 
(0.0194) 
0.6928*** 
(0.0189) 
0.4801*** 
(0.0220) 
Growth of Investment  --- --- 0.2149*** 
(0.0121) 
0.2117*** 
(0.0143) 
--- 0.2350*** 
(0.0152) 
Growth of Aid --- --- --- 0.0079 
(0.0051) 
--- --- 
Within R
2
 
Between R
2
 
Overall R
2
 
0.0164 
0.1470 
0.0368 
0.6139 
0.7956 
0.6531 
0.6792 
0.8812 
0.7259 
0.6787 
0.9104 
0.7347 
0.5530 
0.7058 
0.5875 
0.6317 
0.8605 
0.6887 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Regression 1 is a binary regression of growth on governance. 
Regression 2, 3, and 4 add in the growth of trade, growth of investment, and growth of aid respectively to determine their effects on the 
growth of GDP per capita. 
For regression 5 and 6, I dropped the following years: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2008, and then regressed only the countries that had 
full data for the 8 years left in my sample.  
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Table 7: OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regression Using Six Governance Indicators 
Regression No. 
Observations 
Groups 
7 
2071 
178 
8 
2060 
177 
9 
2042 
176 
10 
455 
39 
11 
524 
46 
Constant -0.0106** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0180*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0561 
(0.0358) 
-0.0857*** 
(0.0330) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.0238 
(0.0242) 
-0.0107 
(0.0153) 
-0.0133 
(0.0136) 
-0.0020 
(0.0337) 
0.0160 
(0.0240) 
Political Stability/ 
Absence of Violence  
0.0609*** 
(0.0159) 
0.0150 
(0.0101) 
0.0212** 
(0.0090) 
0.0012 
(0.0211) 
-0.0105 
(0.0177) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.0211 
(0.0280) 
0.0281 
(0.0178) 
0.0068 
(0.0159) 
0.0066 
(0.0470) 
0.0191 
(0.0209) 
Regulatory Quality 0.1399*** 
(0.0226) 
0.0496*** 
(0.0145) 
0.0406*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0274 
(0.0354) 
0.0838*** 
(0.0200) 
Rule of Law  -0.0949*** 
(0.0321) 
-0.0116 
(0.0204) 
-0.0166 
(0.0182) 
0.0355 
(0.0510) 
-0.0259 
(0.0311) 
Control of Corruption  -0.0021 
(0.0277) 
-0.0452** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.1054** 
(0.0437) 
-0.0022 
(0.0235) 
Growth of Trade  
per Capita 
--- 
0.7313*** 
(0.0137) 
0.5258*** 
(0.0163) 
0.4996*** 
(0.0350) 
0.5172*** 
(0.0347) 
Growth of Investment 
per Capita 
--- --- 
0.2127*** 
(0.0120) 
0.1352*** 
(0.0270) 
0.1482*** 
(0.0199) 
Within R
2
  
Between R
2
  
Overall R
2
  
0.0339 
0.1800 
0.0568 
0.6153 
0.8182 
0.6595 
0.6803 
0.8081 
0.7103 
0.5753 
0.7281 
0.6164 
0.6100 
0.0227 
0.2852 
                  *Statistically significant at the 10% level;       **Statistically significant at the 5% level       ***Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 8: OLS Regression Modeling Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
Regression No. 
Observations 
Groups 
12 
318 
--- 
Constant -0.2865*** 
(0.0904) 
Governance -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
Initial GDP per Capita -0.0000*** 
(0.00) 
Natural Log of Aid  
per Capita  
0.0433*** 
(0.0078) 
Natural Log of Total  
Trade per Capita 
0.0299** 
(0.0136) 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.1264 
0.1152 
       *Statistically significant at the 10% level 
       **Statistically significant at the 5% level 
       ***Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
